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Introduction
Unification of the commercial laws of nation-states is a theme that receives considerable attention from both lawyers and economists. Particularly, drives toward unification of commercial laws within the United Nations, the European Union, and the World Trade Organization are popular topics pursued.
An accepted strand of law-and-economics literature argues that (national) legal systems can converge spontaneously towards facilitating the efficient allocation of scarce resources. A widely held belief is that the international sales laws of nation-states seem particularly likely to converge towards facilitating the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
1 Then, this law-and-economics literature provides legal comparatists with a theoretical framework in which to investigate which international sales laws will be applied by legislators, judges, and arbitrators alike. This is to say that in order to facilitate the optimal allocation of scarce resources (comparative) lawyers will have to select the best legal rules. A related strand of law-and-economics literature is concerned with the issue of whether common-law and civil-law systems are equally capable of developing toward facilitating the optimal allocation of scarce resources. More precisely, this strand of literature addresses the issue of whether either legislators or judges are better able to invoke the legal rules that facilitate the optimal allocation of scarce resources.
2 This paper will develop the point that the existing law-and-economics literature fails to explain why nation-states have always endeavored to unify their commercial laws and intellectual property laws throughout history. 3 Two possible explanations based on the existing law-and-economics literature will be invalidated. For one thing, the possible argument that the preferences of citizens of different nation-states regarding, for example, (international) sales laws are fairly homogeneous, so that the promulgation of a uniform international sales law is a piece of cake anyhow. For another, the possible argument that, for example, both Britain and the United States reduced their (international) sales laws to writing 4 because legislators, as contrasted with judges, are better equipped to adopt those sales laws that facilitate the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
This paper seeks to show that it seems inconceivable that preferences of citizens of different nation-states regarding legal solutions will ever be homogeneous. This will turn out to be equally true for international sales laws. Given heterogeneous preferences of citizens of different nation-states regarding, for example, international sales laws, there is typically a multiplicity of optimal sales laws. For instance, citizens in different jurisdictions may regard their own sales laws as the best. Stated otherwise, the criterion used by the existing law-and-economics literature that those sales laws will be incorporated into a uniform international sales law that facilitate the efficient allocation of scarce resources will not do the trick.
Given that preferences of citizens of different nation-states regarding international sales laws may be heterogeneous, this paper purports to offer a criterion for the selection of international sales laws. A nation-state may have a strong hand in bargaining with other nation-states for the adoption of its own legal rules into a uniform international sales law. This is because nation-states look increasingly likely to sign on to the negotiating line of the nation-state that is able to spur economic growth the most. In seeking the adoption of the legal rules of the nation-state that is best able to boost economic growth, other nation-states will most stimulate their exports to this particular Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (Vienna, 1980) , for example.
nation-state and will attract more foreign direct investments from this particular nationstate, too.
This paper comprises five sections. This section will give a brief outline of the sections that follow. To begin with, Section 2 will convey the thought that even in the case that preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions in separate jurisdictions are identical, national legal systems will not necessarily develop towards convergence spontaneously.
In consequence, without any coordination at all, nation-states will only establish unity in (segments of) their laws by sheer chance. Subsequently, in Section 3 an elementary noncooperative game-theoretical framework will be developed in which two related issues will be considered. The issue of when nation-states have an interest in coordinating their decisions, so that all nation-states involved abide by the same commercial laws. Also, the issue of how a nation-state that is better able to foster economic growth than other nationstates can influence the outcome of such a coordination of decisions between nationstates. Thereafter, Section 4 will investigate whether or not the theoretical arguments advanced in Section 3 sit comfortably with empirical findings. A brief inquiry will focus on efforts to compose uniform laws dealing with bills of exchange and sales throughout the 20 th century. Lastly, in view of Sections 2 to 4, Section 5 will draw several, if related, conclusions.
Divergent or Convergent Preferences of Citizens Regarding Legal Solutions?
This section will, first of all, endeavor to explain when (national) legal systems will develop either towards convergence or divergence. Second, the issue of which portions of the laws of nation-states may, in particular, converge spontaneously will be considered. It will be concluded that the theoretical basis for assuming that (national) legal rules, be it "facilitative" or "interventionist" legal rules, 5 will not develop towards divergence appears dubious. efficient allocation of scarce resources is at their disposal. While all legal solutions in the set available bring an efficient allocation about, these efficient allocations differ in terms of the distribution of welfare among citizens. Consequently, for (national) legal systems to develop toward convergence spontaneously, citizens in separate jurisdictions need to be in accord on both the efficiency and distributional aspects involved in selecting legal solutions. For another, the sharper the disparities in laws of separate jurisdictions, the higher the costs of switching to the legal rules of another jurisdiction. So, although the preferences of citizens in a given jurisdiction may, for whatever reason, at a certain point in time, become identical to those of citizens in another jurisdiction, the costs of complying with the legal rules most preferred may still prevent the switch from being effectuated. This is called a lock-in effect.
9
Two other possibilities can arise. Separate jurisdictions may consist of identical populations, but the preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions within these separate jurisdictions are not identical. Or the preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions within separate jurisdictions are identical, but are divergent from each other. It goes without saying that in these two instances the chances for (national) legal systems to develop towards convergence spontaneously look even more remote. Any development towards sharp divergencies in (national) legal systems is most properly understood as originating directly from divergent preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions.
Obviously, when the preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions vary in different jurisdictions, the legal rules of the one jurisdiction will be unable to meet the preferences of citizens in other jurisdictions. Mattei, for example, also recognizes this phenomenon: '…, let me state clearly that divergences in different legal systems do not imply inefficiencies. Indeed, if there is a prima facie case for the efficiency of a legal doctrine on which there is a large agreement within the competitive market of legal theory and practice, this does not mean that there is just one legal rule efficient for each legal problem. Different legal traditions may develop alternative solutions for the same legal problem that are neutral from the standpoint of efficiency.'
10
To be sure, when the preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions in separate jurisdictions are not identical, this is not to imply that (national) legal rules do no compete with one another anymore. Suppose a person regards a Patek Philippe a better watch than an Audemars Piguet. So, this person buys the Patek Philippe and not the Audemars Piguet. The only conclusion to be drawn is that this person apparently preferred a Patek Philippe to an Audemars Piguet. As for price and quality, both watches are (close) substitutes and, therefore, compete with one another. The very same logic applies to competition among (national) legal rules. Suppose citizens in nation-state A abide by legal rule A instead of legal rule B and in nation-state B citizens abide by legal rule B instead of legal rule A. This is not to say that legal rules A and B do not compete with one another. The only valid conclusion is that the preferences of citizens in nationstate A regarding legal solutions differ from the preferences of citizens in nation-state B.
Needless to say, that the ferocity with which (national) legal rules of different nationstates compete with one another depends on the availability of substitute (national) legal rules.
To summarize, the laws of nation-states look set to develop towards divergence when the preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions in separate jurisdictions vary.
Moreover, even in the case that preferences of citizens regarding legal solutions in separate jurisdictions are identical, the laws of nation-states can develop towards divergence nonetheless. Nevertheless, Anthony Ogus feels able to posit that: '…, the majority view appears to be that, except in relation to the domain of moral or religious norms (e.g. family law), and at least as between jurisdictions at an equivalent stage of social and economic development, there has been a tendency for legal principles to converge.' 11 10 Mattei, U., supra note 8, p. 11. between (national) sales laws will lead to convergence spontaneously. Actually, following this reading reveals that, in view of the facilitative nature of international sales law, the composition of a uniform international sales law ought to be a piece of cake. But, the argument of Ogus runs, institutionally led harmonization of international sales laws of nation-states is superfluous and may even interfere with forces of competition between (national) legal rules. Moreover, divergent preferences of citizens regarding, for example, family law may hardly impede (cross-border) trade and commerce. It follows that institutionally led harmonization of this area of the law may be equally unnecessary. This paper will attempt to demonstrate that the distinction drawn between facilitative law on the one hand and interventionist law on the other may perhaps be less useful than appears at first sight. To obtain the gains from a mutually advantageous trade, merchants will enter into a cross-border sales agreement. In this respect, a marriage does not differ all that much from a sale of goods, for not only do merchants, but also do prospective spouses think their agreement to be mutually advantageous. In any event, a choice of (national) law is, in general, needed to establish arrangements for the performance and enforcement of the sales agreement. In subjecting their cross-border sales agreement to the sales laws of a given nation-state, merchants not only make (extra) gains from trade possible that would not have existed otherwise. But the choice of law, at the same time, also influences the way in which the possible gains from trade will be split between the merchants. From the outset, there is no reason to assume that merchants want the possible gains from trade to be split evenly. Consequently, merchants will be inclined to subject the (cross-border) sales agreement to the laws of their own jurisdiction, for they are best accustomed to these particular legal rules.
17 This is to say that in applying the legal rules of a particular nation-state to the (cross-border) sales agreement, merchants of other nation-states will incur (extra) costs in familiarizing themselves with Jean-Michel Josselin, Edward Elgar, London, 2002, pp. 62-63. these sales laws. In sum, a choice of (sales) law comprises two aspects, namely a distributional and efficiency aspect.
Approach, The Economics of Harmonizing European Law, Editors Alain Marciano and
On the above grounds, it becomes evident that the theoretical basis for assuming that, in reality, (national) legal rules, be it facilitative or interventionist laws, will not develop towards divergence in separate jurisdictions looks terribly weak. This implies that, more often than not, competition between (national) legal rules will fail miserably in achieving uniformity in the laws of nation-states. Then, if unity in a certain segment of the law does encourage (cross-border) trade and commerce indeed, institutionally led harmonization will perhaps be required. The crucial point is that movements for unification of, for example, nationally defined family laws may perhaps draw little support from nation-states, not so much thanks to excessive switch-costs, but, rather, thanks to a relatively small amount of cross-border marriages. On the other hand, in spite of possibly sharp discrepancies in, for example, nationally defined commercial laws, an initiative to unify this area of the law may resonate well with nation-states nonetheless.
Suffice it to say that both examples are only meant to illustrate the problem at hand. But there is something more at work here, for a uniform commercial law produced by nation-
states not only makes (extra) gains from trade possible, but also influences the distribution of the possible gains to be reaped from trade and commerce. Deciding about which legal rules to incorporate into a uniform commercial law, nation-states, at the same time, bargain about the distribution of possible future gains from trade to be had by their respective merchants. The point is that in adopting the legal rules of a particular nationstate into the uniform commercial law, merchants of other nation-states will incur (extra) costs in familiarizing themselves with these particular laws.
Processes of Unifying the Commercial Laws of Nation-States Modeled as an Elementary Non-Cooperative Game
Strategic interdependence can involve many players and many strategies, but this section is limited to a two-person game with two strategies.
Efforts directed toward unifying the commercial laws of nation-states will be modeled as a non-cooperative game. For simplicity, it is assumed that the preferences of a nation- Consequently, in adopting the laws of nation-state A into a uniform commercial law, the representative household of nation-state B will have to bear extra transaction costs. 18 That is, the transaction costs of complying with legal solutions that are not preferred the most.
Also, the transaction costs of getting accustomed to different legal solutions. The same holds true the other way around. In the game this is expressed as follows:
: C A B discounted transaction costs incurred by nation-state A in switching to the legal rules of nation-state B.
Further, the promulgation of a uniform commercial law may create extra gains from trade and commerce. In the game this is expressed as follows:
discounted benefits of extra (cross-border) trade and commerce generated by nation-state A in switching to the legal rules of nation-state B.
To be sure, when nation-states A and B, regardless of disunity in their respective national laws, do not engage in any cross-border trade and commerce, the benefits of complying with the legal rules of the other jurisdiction amount to nothing. In this case, a uniform commercial law aimed at lifting legal barriers between nation-states A and B will only threaten to cripple trade and commerce within at least one of the two nation-states. Thus, the higher the volume and value of cross-border trade and commerce between nationstates A and B, the higher the benefits of switching to the legal rules of the other jurisdiction get.
The problem at hand can be translated into a normal-form representation of a game. The variables in the figure represent the assumed payoffs received by nation-states A and B for each combination of strategies that could be chosen by the respective nationstates. The first variable represents the payoff to nation-state A; the second variable the payoff to nation-state B. It is assumed in the model that , , ,
and C , C equal 0. Hereafter, five cases will be explored at some length. Several cases offer two symmetric possibilities. For convenience sake, the first possibility will be addressed only. Of course, had the second possibility been discussed, the conclusions drawn would have been exactly symmetrically reversed.
-Case 1
Clearly, it makes no sense at all for either nation-state to switch to the legal rules of the other nation-state, for the extra transaction costs incurred in doing so always outweigh the extra benefits generated. In fact, adherence to one's own legal rules is the single optimal choice of strategy for each nation-state, no matter what the other nation-state does. Both cell turns out to be the unique solution of the game. Of course, in this case, nation-states will only balk at unifying their commercial laws. This allows nationally defined commercial laws to diverge ever further.
A subcase of special interest is obtained when: For example, the laws of nation-state A reduce transaction costs more than the laws of nation-state B. Hence, in switching to the legal rules of nation-state A, nation-state B will stimulate its trade and commerce not only with nation-state A, but probably also within its own confines. Recall that the preferences of nation-state B regarding legal solutions are assumed different from the preferences of nation-state A. Thus, nation-state B judges the legal solutions produced by the legal system of nation-state A unfavorably on grounds other than their ability to encourage economic growth. Consequently, to nation-state B, the costs of complying with unpreferred legal solutions exceed the benefits of extra trade and commerce generated in abiding by the legal solutions of nation-state A. Interestingly enough, this result can also be yielded when the assumption in the model that the preferences of nation-state B regarding legal solutions are different from the preferences of nation-state A is abandoned. Now, nation-state B, in principle, will be bent on abiding by the legal rules of nation-state A. But, thanks to excessive costs of getting accustomed to legal rules that are different, yet preferred the most, nation-state B will, nevertheless, be prevented from switching to the legal rules of nation-state A. 19 A strictly dominant strategy outperforms all of that player's other strategies, irrespective of the other player's choices. A weakly dominant strategy is always at least as good as any other of that player's strategies and, moreover, is strictly better against at least one of the opponent's strategies. Nation-state A will never switch to the legal rules of nation-state B, because the extra transaction costs incurred in doing so always outweigh the extra benefits obtained.
Hence, irrespective of nation-state B's choice, nation-state A will invoke its own legal rules. On the other hand, nation-state B, in principle, might very much like nation-state A to switch to its legal rules, but should, nevertheless, count on nation-state A using its strictly dominant strategy. Lacking a strictly or weakly dominant strategy, nation-state B's best response to nation-state A's strictly dominant strategy is, then, to adhere to the legal rules of nation-state A, too. In consequence, the upper-left cell is the unique solution of the game. This, in turn, means that the legal rules of nation-state A will be placed into a uniform commercial law. , 1951, pp. 286-295. 21 When a player in a game uses a so-called pure strategy, a player chooses an action with certainty. On the other hand, when a player in a game employs a so-called mixed strategy, a player chooses between its possible actions with given probabilities. The combination of pure strategies in a game is in Nash equilibrium if, given the strategy of the one player, the other player cannot increase his or her payoffs by choosing a strategy other than his or her equilibrium strategy. In this paper it is not necessary to consider a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. 22 See, for example, Cooper, R., Coordination Games, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Edited by Peter Newman, Macmillan Reference Ltd., London, 1998, p. 474. to the lower-left cell. That is, when nation-state A does not play according to Nash equilibrium (A,A), but deviates to B. Similarly, the denominator in this ratio corresponds to the loss in payoffs to nation-state A when moving from the lower-right cell to the upper-right cell. That is, when nation-state A does not play according to Nash equilibrium (B,B), but deviates to A. The higher the ratio, the more attractive it is for nation-state A to coordinate on Nash equilibrium (A,A) . Similarly, nation-state B's risk situation is related to the ratio . The higher this ratio, the more attractive it is for nation-state B to coordinate on Nash equilibrium (B,B The normal-form representation of the game is then as follows. Case 4 is similar to Case 3 in that the game produces two Nash equilibria in pure strategies, (A,A) and (B,B). Again, the game-theoretical structure that results turns out to correspond with a Coordination Game. Yet, as opposed to the preceding case, in this case the one Nash equilibrium does not Pareto-dominate the other. But one Nash equilibrium will still risk dominate the other. Indeed, Nash equilibrium (A,A) risk dominates Nash equilibrium (B,B) if, and only if, . In discussing which Nash equilibrium may be risk dominant, a subcase will be considered: The transaction costs incurred in complying with the legal rules of the other jurisdiction are the same for nation-states A and B respectively. Additionally, in switching to the legal rules of the other jurisdiction, the benefits of extra cross-border trade and commerce generated by either nation-state A or B are equal to the benefits of the nation-state that still adheres to its own legal rules. One interpretation is that the benefits of extra crossborder trade and commerce are split evenly between nation-states A and B. Then, the condition for Nash equilibrium (A,A) to risk dominate Nash equilibrium (B,B) reverts to , which is the case if, and only if, .
Consequently, the legal rules of the nation-state that is most able to foster economic growth will be placed into a uniform commercial law. In all events, though none of the standard equilibrium refinements rules out one of the two Nash equilibria, it can, on the basis of the existing literature, be concluded that, absent a Pareto-dominant Nash equilibrium, nation-states A and B seem most likely to succeed in coordinating on the risk-dominant Nash equilibrium.
In view of this possibility, suppose, for the sake of argument, that the laws of nation-state A reduce transaction costs less than the laws of nation-state B. For example, nation-state A abides by its own legal rules on grounds other than transaction-costs reduction. However, in spite of legal rules that do not reduce transaction costs the most, nation-state A is, nevertheless, stronger able to foster economic growth than nation-state B. Recall that the preferences of nation-state B regarding legal solutions are assumed different from the preferences of nation-state A. Perhaps nation-state B, in principle, judges the legal solutions produced by the legal system of nation-state A unfavorably because of the very fact that its own legal rules are better able to reduce transaction costs.
At any rate, any argument advanced that the legal rules of nation-state A ought to be placed into a uniform commercial law because, as compared to the legal rules of nationstate B, these particular legal rules reduce transaction costs the most is rendered essentially useless. Instead, the question of introducing either the legal rules of nationstate A or B into a uniform commercial law is solely decided upon the ability of either nation-state to spur economic growth. This is to say that the reason for adopting the laws of nation-state A into a uniform commercial law boils down to nation-state A's stronger ability to advance economic growth than nation-state B. If nation-state A switches to the legal rules of nation-state B, then the payoffs yielded by nation-state B will be the highest. Then again, given that Nash equilibrium (A,A) risk dominates Nash equilibrium (B,B) this is not very likely to happen. Accordingly, for all unpreferred legal solutions produced by the legal system of nation-state A, nation-state B will, driven by its own interest, still press for incorporation of the legal rules of nation-state A into a draft of a uniform commercial law. Unity in nationally defined laws may perhaps help to sweep away some of the many legal obstacles that stand in the way of cross-border trade and commerce among nation-states. At first blush, it may seem that, joined in a desire to promote cross-border trade and commerce, the interests of nation-states coincide completely. Indeed, in clearing legal hurdles for cross-border trade and commerce, every nation-state may stand to reap benefits from a surge in economic activity. Stated otherwise, purely self-interested nation-states, constrained by economic rivalry, will try to provide those laws to their own citizens that reduce transaction costs the most. On this ground, the view that, in overcoming legal obstacles to cross-border trade and commerce, nation-states will, albeit unintentionally, resort to the same laws over time has come to be widely accepted. If this thinking were correct, the unintended result of unbridled pursuit of self-interest by nation-states would be a spontaneous convergence of nationally defined laws, as if guided by an "invisible hand". Without any coordination between nation-states at all, unity in nationally defined laws will be brought about in those fields where a fall in legal barriers does actually stimulate economic growth, the argument continues. Thus, whereas some areas of the law, such as, for example, sales law will develop towards convergence spontaneously, other areas of the law, such as, for example, family law, will not. It is the needs of trade and commerce that mediate.
On closer scrutiny, however, the charge that, in advancing cross-border trade and commerce, the interests of nation-states coincide completely cuts the corner too close.
Even when nation-states subscribe to the aim of unifying their laws on, say, sales voluntarily, this seems unlikely to entail accepting exactly the same legal solutions. This is because elimination of legal roadblocks to cross-border trade and commerce does not only make extra gains from trade possible, but, at the same time, also influences the distribution of the possible gains to be had. Even in the case that citizens in separate jurisdictions have identical preferences regarding legal solutions, a whole set of legal solutions that generate an efficient allocation remains at their disposal. While all legal solutions in the set available bring an efficient allocation about, these efficient allocations differ in terms of distribution. Will nation-states succeed in selecting legal solutions that generate the very same efficient allocation without any coordination at all? This sounds highly implausible.
Moreover, nation-states will always have to incur costs in complying with legal rules of another jurisdiction. That is, even when the preferences of citizens in a given jurisdiction regarding legal solutions, for whatever reason, at a certain point in time, become identical to those of citizens in another jurisdiction, the costs of switching to unfamiliar legal rules, though now preferred the most, will still have to be borne. Thus, the sharper disparities in commercial laws of separate jurisdictions, the higher the costs of switching to the legal rules of another jurisdiction. It can be mentioned aside that with divergent preferences of citizens in separate jurisdictions regarding legal solutions, compliance with legal rules that are not preferred the most creates additional costs.
Again, this opens the way for divisions to emerge between nation-states. For, in the first instance, nation-states may be bent on retaining their own legal rules. Thereby, any possible costs incurred in switching to legal rules of another jurisdiction are avoided. In sum, when it comes to lifting legal hurdles for cross-border trade and commerce, nationstates seem unlikely to read from precisely the same play sheet.
In light of the foregoing considerations, modeling drives for unification of (parts of) the commercial laws of nation-states as a non-cooperative game, three basic gametheoretical structures can arise. First of all, it may turn out that the extra costs incurred by every nation-state of switching to the legal rules of any other nation-states will exceed the extra benefits obtained. Of course, in this instance, a plan to unify divergent commercial laws will be thwarted by nation-states. This allows nationally defined commercial laws to diverge ever further. Secondly, it may turn out that the extra costs incurred by the one nation-state of switching to the legal rules of the other nation-states exceed the extra benefits obtained. However, the same is not true the other way around. In this instance, the one nation-state will never switch to the legal rules of the other nation-state.
Consequently, in reducing legal impediments for cross-border trade and commerce, this will force the other nation-state to switch. Lastly, it may turn out that the extra costs incurred by the one nation-state of switching to the legal rules of the other nation-state do not exceed the extra benefits obtained. The same holds the other way around. This gametheoretical structure corresponds with a so-called Coordination Game. The game demonstrates that, without any coordination at all, nation-states will only establish unity in (segments of) their laws by sheer chance. This is to imply that in order to achieve unity in (portions of) their laws, nation-states do need to coordinate their actions, for example by composing a uniform commercial law. While each nation-state in the game prefers that all nation-states coordinate their actions, the outcomes do not necessarily distribute the gains of coordination equally among the nation-states. Yet, the game itself does not address the issue of whether nation-states will ever be able to resolve disputes over which national legal rules to incorporate into a uniform commercial law.
In this respect, this paper holds the view that in order for an effort to reach unity in nationally defined commercial laws to succeed, it requires the approval of a nationstate that is a powerful engine of economic growth. More often than not, one particular nation-state may be better able to foster economic growth than other nation-states. As a result, other nation-states will be more dependent upon exports to and capital investments from this particular nation-state than the other way around. By adopting the commercial laws of a nation-state that is strongest able to spur economic growth, other nation-states will most stimulate their own trade and commerce and most attract foreign direct investments as well.
Sure enough, in abiding by the laws of a nation-state that is strongest able to drive economic growth, other nation-states will have to incur extra costs. That is, the extra costs of getting accustomed to unfamiliar legal solutions. Also, the extra costs of complying with legal solutions that are possibly not preferred the most. But these initial (extra) costs may be offset by the possible future gains from the expected rise in the volume and value of trade and commerce with the said nation-state. So, the uniform commercial law produced not only makes (extra) gains from trade possible, but also influences the distribution of the possible gains to be reaped from trade and commerce.
Nation-states may stand to gain the most when the legal rules of the nation-state that is better able to foster economic growth than other nation-states are introduced. Yet, at the same time, the nation-state that is most able to stimulate economic growth does not have to incur the (extra) costs of switching to the legal rules of another jurisdiction. Then again, for all extra future gains from trade and commerce created by a uniform commercial law, excessive costs of switching to legal rules that are unfamiliar and perhaps even less preferred may still prevent a nation-state from implementing the said uniform commercial law.
The theoretical arguments adduced in this paper rested ultimately upon a brief analysis of empirical observations. Projects aimed at unifying nationally defined commercial laws in the course of the 20 th century were subjected to scrutiny. In the 20 th century nation-states only looked intent on unifying those segments of the law that created roadblocks for cross-border trade and commerce the most. In effect, all portions of the laws of nation-states seemed susceptible to a development towards divergence, but enacting a uniform law was only worth the effort when divergent legal rules shackled foreign trade and commerce. As matters turned out, with national commercial laws splintering ever more, nation-states called for the construction of uniform laws pertaining to bills of exchange and sales, in particular. As productions of uniform commercial laws had always been fraught with difficulties, empirical evidence does not lend support to the thesis that commercial laws of nation-states will converge spontaneously. What is more, the theoretical argument that a nation-state that is better able to generate economic growth than other nation-states will be able to enjoy significant influence over the drafting of a uniform commercial law is also supported by the empirical findings.
